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PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS - A LEGA
PERSPECTIVE L
1. INTRODUCTION
Disasters in the construction industry are a common occurrence, In the const ti
di id d if d rue Ionsector isasters may be avoi e I ue care and caution are practised by the p, 1 d' " ,I Th' . ersons
mvo ve, ,I,n, building pr~Jects, IS ,pap,er examines the legal duties and
responsibilities of parties in the construction industry, with particular ernphasi
h d
' '1 d ' , 2 IS on
t e uties of protessiona s or contract a mimstrators ,
The rights of disaster victims arise under the law of contract' where the requireme t
of privity of contract' are met andlor under the law oftorts. Malaysian courts hav s
for long recognized the liability of tortfeasors for personal injury and death claims
and for claims of property damage, There was, however, a reluctance to found
liability for pure economic loss,
This position appears to have changed of recent. A number of developments in the
area of recovery for pure economics have been made the in the Commonwealth
region, The court has, following the developments in other jurisdictions shown a
, '
willingness to found liability for pure economiC loss,
I In a construction contract, to ensure the successful completion of a particular project, a number of
agreements and contracts are executed, For. example, first there is the contract of employment
between the employer and the contract adrrumstrator who may be an engineer or an architect
(professional). Next, the contract of works is executed between the employer and the main contractor.
Thirdly, there will be a number of sub-contracts, executed between the main contractor and either the
nominated or domestic sub-contractors.
2 A professional in a construction industry is bound by two contracts: the terms of his contract of
employment and to observe his duties and obligations underline.d in the main contract between the
employer and the main contractor. It is inevitable that when parties are locked into such an embrace
there are bound to be difficulties in defining and distinguishing roles, respons~bilities, and ascertainin~
the legal position of the parties involved. There are two ways to res?lve this tangle: the third party
could function on behalf of one or the other party to the contract; or It could occupy an independent
position between the parties, with duties to both of them. In a standard form of building contract, a
professional take the latter position. . . ., .
l A contract is executed between two parties and If one party had failed 111 Its obligations, the innocent
party may recover damages for the loss occasioned by the failure of the other party to comply with its
obligation. . ., . . .
4 Under the la\\ of contract, liability and responslblhtles of the parties IS gov~med by the doctrine of
privity of contract. That doctrine may not operate successfully I~ a construction contract considering
th chain of partie involved in carrying out the works. Th~ mam contract~r .and ~he employer enter
int th ontract of works. The professional, who ISrespons.lble for th~ administration of the contract,
ha to ob rv th duties and responsibilities that appear. 111 the main contract. The common law
d t
· f ori f ontra t e tablishes that only the parties to a contract can sue and be sued on it·
nne 0 pnvity 0 " .'it ner confer ri ht nor Impose liabilities on persons who are not parties to the contract
n 11 It r conn r fig .
There is an urgent need to define duties and extent of liability of professionals
considering the increasing development in the construction industry. The question of
liability and responsibility is an issue that must be handled with great caution.
Imposing liability on a person or an organisation will have grave consequences.
However, the issue of greater importance is human life and safety. When the two are
balanced, there is no doubt that the scales must tip in favour of ensuring that human
errors and negligence should not be allowed to endanger human lives.
This paper describes the liability in Malaysian law, of professionals and contract
administrators for losses incurred by disaster victims. The discussion begins with a
definition of the duties of a professional and ~ontinue~ to explore concurrent liability
in contract and tort imposed upon the professlOnal. Finally, the discussion examines
the right of a plaintiff to recover for pure economic loss, where there is no injury to
person or property. The words "architect", "engineer" and "professional" are used
interchangeably in this paper and they all mean a contract administrator.
2. DUTIES
2.1 Duties under the standard forms of contract
The duties of a professional are speJt out under the standard forms of contract
used in the building industry. In Malaysia, two standard forms are used in
. 5
most proJects.
2.2 General duties of professionals
The available literature is exhaustive on the duties of professionals. Gajria"
considers that the architect has a duty to inspect the site and advise the owner
about its suitability or otherwise.7 Apart from advising the owner about site
conditions the professional was also under a duty to prepare plans.f
drav ings, 'specifications, estimates and other necessary details accor~ing to
th
. ements of the owner; to prepare the tenders; and to supervise the
e requir . f h b ildi 9construction work up until the completlOn 0 t e Ul mg. Hudson is even
S P . . he ori t ise the PAM/ISM Form 169 and the PWD Form 203 is used in contracts
arti 10 t e pnvate sec or 1 M h 1998 h P . .
h
. h G t f Malaysia is a party. SlIlce arc , t e new AM 1998 Form IS In
to \ IC the ovemmen 0
u e . C t ts i I di 3'd di6 G' . R I ti t Buildino and Engineenng on rae S 10 n ra, e itron, Tripathi
UJrHl G T.. aw e a 1I1g 0 '"
Private Ltd, Bombay, 19 5, p. 70. . Ptd Ltd [1992] APCLR 91.
7 P /I If' 'G Itteridge Ha kins & Davey ,1/ en C' 1101 ~ I. ! r 8 t ion 67 DLR (3d) 95. In the same case, the dissenting judgement
Vermont Con trlletloll lie. v ea 5 . . d fecti I' h .held th t an architect i liable for damagedcbau~ed by his e ective pans Just as t e supplier of a
d t: r., d . li ble for damaoe cause y It.It: nve pro uct I ia . ~ C t t s" edition Sweet & Maxwell, London 1991 at p
9 nthony lay, Keating on BUlldmg on rae 'th 1926 at 9 ' , .
31
.. s. H 'Ion' Building ontraets,7 ed. p. .
. ciunz If m II.




Some of the duties of an architect include informing an owner whether an
restrictive covenants or rights of adjoining owners bound the land. This calls
for him to be familiar with statues and by-laws that might affect the works to
be executed.
An architect should also supply the builder with copies of the contract
drawings and supervise the project works.
Where a contractor was not proceeding with the work "regularly and
diligently", an architect has a duty to first issue a notice to the contractor
specifying his default. If an architect fails to issue such a notice and
subsequently the contractor is terminated, then the clients, due to the non-
action of the architect, will be in breach of duty. I I .
Finally, an architect was responsible for issuing interim and final certificates
that the work was completed to his satisfaction.
Abrahamson" feels that an engineer's duty should include the giving of
advise to the client on the choice of the form of contract, to avoid increases in
prices due to inflation but to include any expected disruption claims which
may be made by the contractor. Where a client wished to economise, an
enzinecr ought not to merely mention the risk of cutting costs but he should
b 13
also state that the job was not guaranteed.
2.3 Standard of Duty
From the above definitions, it is apparent that the architect owes a duty of
care to both the employer and the contractor. It then follows that the next
issue is the standard of such duty.
The standard is that of an ordinary competent architect. If a responsible body
or architects would have acted as this architect had done that is sufficient for
his purpose: he is not to be condemned as n~gligent Il(;rely be~au~e some
other body of architects would have acted differently. The cntena to be
applied v as that a professional, when he under ta~es work, assures that the
work \ ill be completed to a proper and workman like standard, to administer
10 Walter Cabbot COil nuction Ltd v The Queell, 44 D.L.R. (ed) 82.
11 Jr! t: I" I . te v London Borough o/Newham [1995] 11 Const. LJ 157.
r t r au fill r /' 'OCW • ') th ., ..
12 M \ b I ngineering Law and the I.C.E. Contracts, 4 edition, Applied SCIence
a . ra 1 m on.
Pu II her. Lond n, 1979, p. 376. .n C ... rB' tfor ( . K P & Wallace-Carruthers & Assoczates Ltd, 23 DLR (2d) 640 Can.
If) OJ rant OIl \ em . 7 37 B 'Id LR 92
I~ r aund r. and Partn r. \' Alan Bristow (198 ) U1. .
- ..,
the co~tract, to render hi~ services. in a professional manner and to meet the
recognised standards of hIS profession. ..
3. CONCURRENT LIABILITY
A person performing professional services may be liable concurrently in contra t d. . f c an
in negligence unl~ss the te~s 0 t~e cO.ntract precluded the tortious liability. There
was no sound basis for reading an implied term into every contract to the effect th t
the relationship of the parties was to be governed by the law of contract 0 lv
H
. f n y.
owever, the parties may, by virtue 0 the terms of their contract, exclude or modify
the common law duty. Any contractual exclusion of a duty of care needs to be
explicit or to emerge in the contract as a matter of necessary implication.
The question of whether a professional adviser may be held liable concurrently in
both contract and negligence has been the subject of a vast amount of legal writing.
Many judges have toiled with the problem and many more academics have
commented upon their efforts. The main impediment to the.acceptance of concurrent
liability has been lawyers' deep-rooted but misplaced deference to the primacy of
contract.
Decisions and literature are overwhelmingly in favour of concurrent liability. This
preponderance of support for concurrent liability r~flects the.merits of the following
contention. A person who has performed professional services may be held liable
concurrently in contract and in negligence unless the terms of the contract preclude
the tortious liability.
The broad view is that where persons have entered into a contractual relationship
their liabili ty is to be governed by the te~s o~ the contract and nothing else. Such a
view was based on the notion that the parties intended, or must be presumed to have
intended that the contractual terms, which they agreed to, would be definitive of
their liability one against the other. This percepti_on of the parties' presumed
intention has led to judicial decisions that have permitted concurrent liability to be
invoked. But again, these decisions have held that the duty in negligence must arise
so independently of the contract that it must be able to be established without
reference to or proof of the contract. 15 It has als~ been st~ggested that the contractual
duty and the tortious duty must be at least slightly different or non-coextensive
before concurrent liability can exist.
Caus s of action have overlapped for centuries and will no doubt continue to do so.
When this overlap happens and a plea in both contact ~nd tort is entered plaintiffs
should not b tr at d differently; and they should be entitled to choose the particular
c u of action that is most favourable to them. At the same time, it must be
. Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon
accepted that the parties may, by virtue of the terms of their contract exclude or
modify the common law duty. '
3.1 Concurrent Liability in the Building Industry
In Malaysia, the architect derives his powers from two documents: the
agreement executed between him and the employer and the Standard Forms
of Building Contracts. 16 This is a strange phenomenon - he is appointed by
only one of the parties to the construction contract, i.e. the employer to whom
he is contractually bound by his contract of employment, and yet he has to
assume independent duties to both parties under the construction contract.
This obligation exists although he does not have any legal relationship with
the contractor and other third parties. Not only is he under a contractual
obligation to the employer but also owes a duty of care to other persons who
were his "neighbours" and where he had accepted a voluntary assumption of
responsibility. 17
In Pacific Associates Inc and Another v Baxter and Others, 18 the extent of an
engineer's contractual and tortious liability was discussed. The defendants
were an engineering partnership and the contract between the contractors and
the employer provided that the defendants would be responsible to supervise
the work. The trial judge held that the defendants were the employer's
agents. They did not owe a duty of care towards the plaintiffs for the acts for
which under the contract, the employer could be held liable. It can be seen
that where the contractual mechanisms provided for adequate remedies, the
courts are slow to impose tortious liability upon the wrongdoer.
However, if the courts were to be allowed to continue to flow along this tide
of thought, it would mean that a pers?n may be allo,,:,ed to defend a claim in
negligence made against him by a third party by saying that he was working
under a contract for his employer and that the only duty he owned was his
contractual duty to his employer. In Voli v Inglewood Shire Council
l9
Windeyer J clearly stated:
. } tl t . IS 0.( the architect's ellgagement, nor the terms of the building
... neit ter te et II ') .erate to discharge the architect from a duty of care to persons
COil tract, call op .'
}
. to tllose contracts. Nor can they directly determine what he
IV 10 are strallge!s .'d './:. } 's dutv to suoa;persons That duty IS cast upon hun by law,
11111 toto saNs}/ II J
I
d a COil tract but because he entered upon the work.not because Ie lila e .
16 VD F 203 Government Contracts Form and Condition 2 of the PAM/SM 69
lau e 2 of the P\ orm
Private ontract Form for architects. .17 • fL d D nninoinEssoPetrolelim Co Ltd v Marden [1976]2WLR595.
ee the Judgement 0 or e '"
1 [19 0] I .
1 (19 .) 110 LR 74 at p. 5.
7The tort of negligence duty in building projects was examined thoroughly in
the NZ case of Bowen v Paramount Builders.2o The Court of A eal
(Wellington) held that: pp
Contractors, architects and engineers were all subject to a duty to use
reasonable care to prevent damage to persons whom they should reasonabl
expect to be affected by their work. y
A_ builder or a:chitect could not defend an action for negligence made against
hIm by a third person on the ground that he had complied with th
requirements of his contract wi~h the owner. The nature of his contractua~
duties, however, may have considerable relevance in deciding whether he has
been negligent or not.
In the United States of America, the courts have recognised that the general
principles of negligence apply to builders and architects. The matter is
discussed in Prosser's Law a/Torts (4th ed) 680-682.
One important limitation recogni::ed in several cases is that the contractor is not
liable if he has merely carried Ollt carefully the plans, specifications and
directions given him, since in that case the responsibility is assumed by the
employer, at least where the plans are not so obviously defective and dangerous
that no reasonable man would follow them. Where this is the case there
appears to be no doubt that there will be liabiiuy." '
However, it is not always that an architect may be held concurrently liable in
contract and in tort. Where there was adequate machinery under the contract
between the employer and the contractor to enforce the contractor's rights
thereunder and no good reason at tender stage to suppose that such rights of
machinery would not together provide the contractor with an adequate
remedy, then, in general, a certifying archi~ect or en~ine~r would not owe to
the contractor a duty in tort co-termmous with the obligation in contract owed
22
to the contractor by the employer.
Whether or not a duty of care existed between the parties is ultimately a
question as to what is just a~d re~sonable. It is not suggested that the
existence of a contractual relatIOnshIp was an absolute bar to a duty of care
beinz found to exist in tort beyond the ambit of the contract. However, it
would b unusual where the obligation is not expressly or impliedly stated in, . .
the contract, to hold that one of the contractmg parnes had an additional
obligation in tort.23
2°[1977] 1 '7LR39-l.
21 Pros er . Lawof Tor! (4Ihed)atp. 681.
12[ . E . C of -uction Co LtdvKaDuklnvestment Co Ltd (1989) 47 BLR 139 .
• 011 .11 111 enng . Oil II
23 ill lair fiord r 0' I(/Ih:~' .'Co \' Natiollalillsurallce Co of NZ, [1992] 2 NZLR 706.
oIn Michael Sallis & Co Ltd v Cali! and William F Newman & Associates'"
the court considered the potential liability of an architect to a contractor
under a contact similar in terms to the current Malaysian PAM and Honz
Kong standard forms and the former Singapore SIA 79 form. 0
It was there held that an architect owed a duty of care to the contractor to act
fairly as between him and the employer in matters such as the issue of
certificates and the grant of extensions of time. If the architect had acted
unfairly in respect of matters in which the contract required him to act
impartially, a contractor might recover damages from him to the extent that
the contractor was able to establish damage resulting from the architect's
unfairness and so might recover purely economic loss.
There is- still no doubt that the architect or engineer is under a duty to act
fairly and impartially as between the contractor and the employer in matters
such as certificates and extensions of time, but in Pacific Associates Inc v
Baxter", the Court of Appeal in England exhaustively reviewed the duties
owed by architects and engineers to contractors and appears to have put paid
to the traditional view and expressly doubted the correctness of the holding in
Michael Sallis & Co Ltd v CaW
26
.
The narrow interpretation of the decision is that whether an engineer acting
as certifies under an engineering contract owes a duty of care to the
contractor will depend on all the circumstances, including the terms of the
contract between the employer an the contractor, the contractual background
and the presence or absence of an arbitration clause enabling the engineer's
decisions to be reviewed. In that case, too, the form of contract was based on
the FIDIC International Civil Engineering Conditions, 2
nd
edition, 1969,
which contained a number of clauses not usually found in building contracts
and rare even in engineering forms. In particular, there was an express
special condition, which provided that:
"'tl e iber 0' the employer' staff nor the engineer nor any of his staff, nor the
et ier any /II " ') ," ntative shall be in ally way personally liable for the acts or obligations
engineer s represe ' ,d
I
tr t 01' a/lswerablefior any default or omission on the part of the employer in
1/11 er t Ie con lac, . . -'
I
b . pelfiOI'mance or any of the acts, matters, or things which are herein
t Ie 0 sen'allce 01 '), d" P ;{; Associates Inc v Baxter, (1988) 16 ConLR 90,
contatne : actfic
3.2 Apportionment of Liability
Liability may be apportioned according to the person who performed th
tasks. In District of Survey v Church27, the defendant was an archit et. . fi I ec
engaged by an .engmeenng irm to conduct soil studies on site. The engineers
on two occasions recommended that more extensive soil investigations
should be undertaken but were told by the architect, without justification that
the plaintiff 0v.:ner "would not go for it". Subsequently the building insp~ctor
requested a sod report and under pressure from the architect, the engineers
sent a letter sugge.sting t.hat the soil. was adequate to support the proposed
building. On this baSIS, the design and construction of the building
proceeded.
The completed building subsided because of soil conditions which would
have been revealed if the soil conditions .were not examined merely
superficially. The Court held that both the archItect and engineers were liable
to the owners for the damage sustained; the architect was liable for breach of
contract and the engineers liable in tort for negligence.
4. PURE ECONOMIC LOSS
The most controversial area of recovery in the tort of negligence, especially in
building disputes is the reco,:,ery .of pur~ economic los.s. As observed by
Stapleton.i'' economic loss claIms m negligence has continued to confound the
courts. The House of Lords has for several years appeared to have been intent on a
U-turn away from liability for such lo~s. According to Stapleton, the result was a
lopsided protectionism: courts were mcreasmgly generous and plaintiff-centred
where they saw no danger to the sphere or contractual relations, 'but unsympathetic
and defendant-parallel in the economic loss cases of today.
The law is clear: pure economic loss was not recoverable in tort in the absence of a
special relationship of proximity between the tortfeasor and the claimant whereby a
duty of care would be imposed on t~~ tortfeas~r .to safegua:-d the claimant from
conomic loss_29 What then is the pOSItIOn of plaintiffs who WIsh to recover for pure
economic loss in building claims? Can such a plaintiff be denied a remedy merely
because there is no proximity between the tortfeasor and him?
4.1 Polic I Considerations
Th
ti e-old reason for disallowing economic loss was the "floodgates"1m h c. . . 1 d .
t
The concern was with t e unrairness mvo ve in holding
argum n . . b f clai .d fendants liabl to an indetermmate num er 0 c aimants and/or for claims
of ind~tenninate size. . Courts were reluctant to extend the liability of
prof~ssIOn~ls to co~er ~nsta~ces of p~re eco~omic loss due to policy
consIderatIOns especially In trying not to Impose liability "in an indeterminate
amount for an indetenninate time to an indeterminate c1ass".3o But whether
this principle of reducing possible future actions would be acceptable in
modem-day situations is questionable.
Another reason for the court~s reluct~nce to allow recovery for pure
economic loss was the perceptton that, In a competitive world where one
person's gain was commonly another's loss, a duty to take reasonable care to
avoid causing mere economic loss to another, a.s distinct from physical injury
to another'S person or property, woul~ b.e inconsistent with community
standards in relation to what was ordinarily legitimate in the pursuit of
31
personal advantage.
If there is a straightforward case in favour of the plaintiff, then a court should
not decide the case against the dictates of justice because of foreseeable
troubles in future in cases that are more difficult. On the practical side, there
ouzht to be boundaries as to the limits of remedies allowed by the courts.
But each case would have to be decided on its own facts, as and when it
arises before the courts and not decided in advance.
4.2 Law of obligations or assumption of responsibility
The combined effect of the two distinct policy considerations was that the
catezories of cases in which the requisite relationship of proximity with
respect to mere economic loss was to be found were properly to be seen as
special. Such cases would involve the element of reliance." or the
assumption of responsibility or a combination of the twO.
33
This is what may
1
. . 3~
be called the law of ob IgatIOns.
Under the law of obligations, a plaintiff trying to cast an obligation on to a
defendant in contract must be able to show that the defendant had assumed
that obligation either expressly or by clear a~d necessary implication. In tort
d
ity however an obligation may be Imposed essentially because the
an eqlll " d . ., 1 hlav sees it as just, reasonable and soun m pnncip e t at such obligation be
impo ed.
10 . T I [1931] 174 E441,444.
. Ultramar . Co/poratlOn v IOUC Ie
)I uth rland Sinn! COl/ncil v Heyman (1985] 157 CLR 503.
P /lllOall COlltracting Co v Pilkington Ltd ( o. 2).
)) . ,[ 19 ] 164 CLR 539 at 545, 576, 593.
H Hawkin \' Clayton to what might be called the law of obligations. The first branch is where
~h r~ are 1\\ branch 'I ensuallyassumed. The second branch is where law imposes them.
bli II n are v iuntan Yor c n db h h fi ld f d eoui
h
f ld of contract and the secon ranc t e ie 0 tort an equity.
The fir Ibr n h repre nt t e ie
••
When the parties have already assumed by contract voluntary obligations it
may be unjust for the law to impose additional obligations in tort. Where it
was just, reasonable and sound in principle, then irrespective of the
contractual obligations, the law must impose the duty. However, where the
asserted duty did not exist in contract because it had not been voluntarily
assumed either expressly or by implication, then the law should not strive to
impose the equivalent duty in tort.
The reluctance of the courts in imposing such a duty was seen in Edgeworth
Construction v Lea & Associates+ The court; in this case, followed the
principle of contractual relationships and proximity while in Bolam v Friern
Hospital Management Committee36 it was held that a doctor was not
negligent if he had acted in accordance with a practice accepted at the time as
proper by a responsible body of medical opinion even though other doctors
had adopted a different practice.37 Although this was a case pertaining to
medical negligence, the same principles were applied by the High Court in a
. I· hit t 38case mvo vmg an arc I ec .
In the Malaysian case of Chin Sin Motor Works Sdn Bhd v Arosa
Development Sdn Bhd39, the court had to consider whether the architect who
issued a final certificate owed a duty of care to his client. Should the architect
have known that the client would solely rely on his certification to make
payments to the first defendant (developer)?
The court referred to Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners
40
where
the decision was that there was a duty of care whenever 'the party seeking
information or advice was trusting the other to exercise such a degree of care
as the circumstances required, where it was reasonable for him to do that and
where the other gave the information or advice when he knew or ought to
have known that the inquirer was relying on him'. The principle was
advanced further in Dutton v Bognor Regis Urban District Councitl where
an inspector of the defend.ant council who had .negligently failed to dis.co:er
that the foundations were madequate and had given approval for the building
of the house to proceed It was held the. defendants were liable. The liability
of the defendant was established once It was found that they owed a duty of
care in gi ing the approval to proceed with the building of the house. The
duty extended to the purchaser of the house.
3j (1991) 4 BLR 11.
J6 [1957] 1 WLR 5 2. ".37 B b Id d J e Swanton in "The Common Lawyer, The Australian Law Journal
ar ara Ic ona an an ' '
01.67,1993. p. 14 . R 588
3 Florida Hotel Ptv Ltd l'II!ayo [1965] 113 CL .
9 [19 2] I III 2 .-
[19 1AC 465.
1[1 72] 1 B 7 .
The court then concluded that the architect owed a duty of care to the client
when he issued certificates of final payments. He ought to have known that
the client would solely rely on its certification to make payments to the first
defendant.
However, in Kerajaan Malaysia v Cheah Foong Chiew and Ors,42 the court
held that the defendant was only responsible for his actions as towards his
employer in contract and was not responsible in tort to the plaintiff. The
damage suffered by the plaintiff was pure economic loss and the defendant
could not be held liable in tort for the loss suffered since there was no
personal injury nor was other property damaged as a result of the allezed
negligence. The court relied on the decision of the HL in Murph; v
Brentwood District Council" and other cases decided subsequently. There
had been no negligent misstatement or advice given to the plaintiff by the
defendant to bring the case within the reliance principle of Hedley Byrne.".
4.3 The Commonwealth Direction - Effect on Malaysia?
However, the Anlls45 liability in tort, abolished by the House of Lords in
Murphy v Brentwood District Council,46 decided as "reasonable and proper"
in Kerajaan Malaysia v Cheah Foong Chiew and Ors
47
has once again been
the subject of heated debate in a trilogy of cases in the Commonwealth.
In Invercargill City Council v Hamlin,48 the New Zealand Court of Appeal
held that councils were liable to house owners and subsequent owners for
defects caused by the building inspectors' negligence. The court observed
that in New Zealand there was a relationship incorporating a duty of care
because of the degree of reliance by house owners on councils to ensure
compliance with building codes and full recognition of that reliance by local
authorities.
In Canada the Supreme Court of Canada recognised in Winnipeg
Condomini:lfll Corp. No. 36 v Bird Constructioll Co. Ltd. 49 that the
negligence posed "a real and substantial danger" to the occupants of the
42 [1993] 2 MLJ 439.
4) [1990] 3 WLR414. .
~~Hedley 8)"lIIe v Heller & Partllers Ltd [1963] 2All ER.575, a case where th~ defend~nts, in response
to b } I
· tiffs had made a representatIOn about the financial standing of a certain
a reque t y t ie p am I , .corporation. The plaintiffs had relied upon this representation and subsequently suffered financial
10 .
45 AIIII v Merton London Borough [1972] 2 All ER 492.
6[1990] WLR414.
47[1 ]2.1149.
4 [19 4] . ZLR ·13
9 nre rt d d non ddi\'ered by the upreme Court of Canada on 26 January 1995.
building and that the ~ost of putting the building back into a non-dangerous
state was recoverable in tort by the occupants. The rationale for the dec' .
h
., . . ISlon
was t at per~ons partlclpatm~ in the construction of a large and permanent
structure which has the capacity to cause serious damage to other persons or
property should be held to a reasonable standard of care.i" The court
adopted the minority view expressed in Rivtow Marine Limited v Washingto '
51 d id d nIronwo~ks, a case eCI e so~e 232 years ago. In arriving at this
conclusion, the court was also guided by the dictum of Lord Macmillan in
Donoghue v Stevenson 52 and Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd. 53
The High Court of Australia in Bryan v Maloney': had to decide whether
under the law of negligence, a professional builder who constructed a house
for the then owner of the land owed a prima facie duty to a subsequent owner
of the house. The duty was to exercise reasonable care to avoid the
foreseeable damage, which the .respondent had sustained in the present case
i.e. a diminution in the :alue of the house when a latent and previously
unknown defect in its footings or structure became rpanifest.
The court held that clear relationship 0 proximity existed between the
appellant and the first owner with respect to ordinary physical injury to self
or property. He was under a duty to exercise reasonable care in the building
50 Ian Duncan Wallace, Q.c. in "Murphy Rejected: Three Commonwealth Landmarks", (1995) 11
Const. L.J. 249-253, 250.
51 [1974 J SCR 1189, 1217. The majority of the Supreme Court endorsed the view that liability for the
cost of repairing damage to the defective article itself and for the e~onomic loss flowing directly from
the negligence, is akin to liability under the terms of an express or implied warranty 0 fitness and as it
is contractual in origin cannot be enforced against the manufacturer by a stranger to the contract.
However Laskin J dissented and his argument was as follows: "the case is not one where a
manufac~red product proves to be merely defective (in sho~, where it has. not met promised
expectations), but rather one where by reason of the defect there I~ a foreseeabl~ risk of physical harm
from its use and where the alert avoidance of such harm gives nse to economic loss. Prevention of
threatened harm resulting directly in economic loss should not be treated differently from post-injury
cure".
S! The dictum of Lord Macmillan is found at p. 610 of the judgement and reads as follows: "The fact
that ther i a contractual relationship between the parties which may give rise to an action for breach
of contract doe not exclude the co-existence of a right of action founded on negligence as between
the same parties, independently of the contract~ though arising out o~ the relati.onship in fact brought
about by the contract. Of this the best illustratIOn IS the right of th~ injured rallwa~ passenger to sue
the railway company either for breach of the contract of safe caITlag~ or for neghgenc.e in carrying
him ... And there is no reason why the same set of facts should not give one person a nght of action
in contract and another per on a right of action in tort.
S3 [19 3J 1 C 520. Thi case held that a common law duty of care may be created by a relationship
of proximity that would not have arisen but for a contract.
$~ [199-) 2 CLJ 503.
work to avoid a foreseeable risk of such injury. That relationshi of
proximity and consequent duty of care extended to mere economic PI. fi oss
sustamed by the irst owner when the inadequacy of the footinzs becam
. b e
manifest.
In Malaysia, the learned judge James Foong, did a remarkable dissection of
the Commonwealth cases when deciding Dr. Abdul Hamid Abdul Rashid &
Anor v Jurusan Malaysia Consultants (sued as a firm) & Drs55 made the
following observation:
Now that the court has found that a claim for pure economic loss call be entertained. ~ .~
shall return to the Circumstances of our case .
His Honour observed that Invercargill City Council had rightly refused to
follow Murphy v Brentwood District Council where the defendant's
council had approved the design on the foundation of a house which was
found by a subsequent purchaser to be defective. The House of Lords in had
Murphy ruled that the defendant's council owed no duty of care to the
plaintiff in respect of the damage.
Murphy was decided in a country which has a piece of legislation called the
Defective Premises Act 1972. In Malaysia, there was no similar legislation.
To adopt the decisions of Murphy and D & F Estates, both decisions of a
jurisdiction with a specific piece of legislation, would be of no application
here. To do so, meant that the entire group of subsequent purchasers in this
country would be left without relief against errant builders, architects,
enzineers and related personnel who were found to have discharged their
duties negligently. Furthermore, the local authorities are protected from suit
under the provisions of section 95 of the Street, Drainage and Building Act
1977. There was no fear that the local authorities' coffers would be
drastically reduced through claims for pure economic loss. To adopt the
principles in Murphy and D & F E.states and t~ ~en~ parties the right to a
remedy would be tantamount to metmg out gross mjustice and that cannot be
condoned.
The learned judge duly considered the Malaysian cases of Kerajaan
Malay ia Cheab Foong Chiew & Anor
57
and Teh Khem On & Anor v
Yeoh & wu Development Sdn Bhd & Or~58 and observe? that the court in
th former case had approved Murphy while the leamed Judge in the latter
ea had adopted the decisions i~ ~urphY and D ~ F Estates. The c~urt, in
Teh \ as of the view that its decIsIOn was founded in the fear of extending the
scope of liability "for an indeterminate class".
In respect of indeterminate class, the learned judge in Dr Abdul H .d
A5~dul Rashid felt that the High Court Justices in Bryan v Maloney be~m~t
It as follows: p
The ~imila.rities between !he relationship between the builder and the first owner and the
relationship between budder and =-r= owner as regards the particular kind of
economic loss are of much greater significance than the differences to which attention has
been drawn, namely the absence of direct contract or dealing and the possibly extended tim
ill which liability might arise. Both relationships are characterized, to a comparable t e
by the assumption of responsibility on the part of the builder and likely reliance on th
ex
ent.' . e part
of the owner. No dlstmctlOn ~all be drawn .between the two relationship in so far as the
foreseeability of a particular kind of economic loss IS concerned; it is obviously foreseeable
that loss will be sustained by w.hichever of the first or subsequent owners who happen to be
the owner at the time when the inadequacy of the footing becomes manifest.
5. CONCLUSION
It is said that the architect's profession is a growing one and that standards of
negligence, care and skill should change as circumstances change. There are new
skills and it is necessary for the architect to keep pace with modern developments.
The fact remains that if he takes upon himself the design of a building, he cannot
escape liability for that design by delegating his duty to the contractor who is going
to do the building. When he approves plans submitted by a contractor, he becomes
responsible for those plans. If they are not plans that an architect using proper care
and skill should have passed, then he remains responsible for those defects that exist
in them.6o
To avoid the creation of liability "for an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate
time to an indeterminate class" because it would open numerous claims has merits.
On the other hand, community's expectation and demand of responsibility and
accountability by third parties who have undertaken a task, to carry out that task with
reasonable care and skill and compliance with relevant statutory provisions and by-
laws is a moral duty to be fulfilled. D~priva~ion of relief for. pure economic loss
suffered by any person is far from upholdIllg this moral expectation.
Any person professional or non-professional, should ~nd mu~t be held responsible
\ here ther was vidence of insufficient regard shown III the discharge of his duties.
Policy con iderations that ensure the right to life and. right to safety mu~t override
legal dictat s. ourts have an important role to play III fo~ulatmg the direction of
th law in thi r gard. They must not deny a party a relIef because to deny an
effective remedy in an obvious case would seem to imply a refusal to acknowledge
the professional's role in the community. In practice, the public relies on
professionals and other persons who assume to undertake certain tasks to carry out
their duties as is expected of them. Judges will have to fashion an effective remedy
for any breach of duty in such a way as to repair the injustice suffered by the
disappointed third person.
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